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Abstract: Publicado em 1998, o estudo de Frankel & Rose na Endogeneidade dos Critérios das Áreas 
Monetárias Ótimas tem sido desde então um poderoso argumento em favor da Zona Euro. Os autores 
encontram uma correlação positiva entre a sincronização dos ciclos económicos e a intensidade do 
comércio, sugerindo que se um país se juntasse à Zona Euro, o consequente aumento do comércio com 
outros estados membros contribuiria para a o alinhamento dos ciclos económicos. Isto mitigaria a 
incidência de choques assimétricos, reduzindo a necessidade de uma política monetária independente. 
Este estudo replica a metodologia dos autores, com algumas adaptações, e faz uso de dados 
contemporâneos. Os resultados apoiam a hipótese da endogeneidade, e mostram que o Euro aumentou 
o comércio entre estados membros em cerca de 21% ceteris paribus. Estes resultados não são, no 
entanto, os mais precisos, devido a certas limitações da abordagem metodológica. 
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Abstract: Published in 1998, Frankel & Rose’s study on the Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area 
Criteria has since been an important argument in favour of the creation of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). They find, empirically, a positive correlation between business cycle synchronization and 
trade intensity, suggesting that if a country joined the EMU, the trade generating effects inherent to such 
a move would naturally contribute to the comovement of business cycles. This would mitigate the 
incidence of asymmetric shocks and reduce the need for an independent monetary policy. This study 
replicates their methodology, with some improvements and a contemporary dataset. The results support 
the endogeneity hypothesis, and show a positive trade generating effect of 21% for the EMU. These 
findings are, however, not the most accurate, due to certain limitations of the methodological approach. 
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Business Cycles: the downward or upward movement of GDP (or other measure of economic activity 
around its long-term growth trend. 
Comovement: in the context of Business Cycle Synchronization, it is a synonym for correlation. 
Demand Shock: an event that triggers a decrease (or increase) in the demand for a certain good (or 
goods) in an economy. 
Idiosyncrasy: in a macroeconomic context, it means a peculiar or unusual feature of an economy, that 
distinguishes it from others. 
Idiosyncratic Shock: synonymous with asymmetric shock; a demand or supply shock that affects two (or 
more) economies in different ways, e.g., increases demand for cars in one and decreases it in another. 
  
Intra-Industry Trade: the exchange of similar products belonging to the same industry. 
Inter-Industry Trade: the exchange of products belonging to different industries; implies that the two 
countries (or regions) engaging in trade are better off specializing their production, along Ricardian lines. 
Openness: the weight international trade has on the total product of an economy; how open an economy 
is to foreign trade. 
Trade Intensity: in the context of this study, how much two countries trade with each other, taking their 
economic size into account. 
Trade Barrier: synonymous with Border Effect; the effect a national border has on trade between two 
regions, after controlling for other factors. 
Multilateral Resistance: an average border effect, encompassing the trade barriers with all trade partners 
of an economy. 
 
Endogeneity: in econometrics, it refers to an explanatory variable that is correlated with the perturbation 
term, resulting in a biased point estimate for that variable and potentially compromising the overall 
consistency of the model; the opposite of exogeneity. 
Dyadic Dataset: a dataset whose observations consist of a pair of elements; in the context of this study, 






CU: Currency Union 
ECB: European Central Bank 
EMU: European Monetary Union 
ERM: European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
EU: European Union 
FD: First Differences Model 
FE: Fixed Effects Model 
GMT: Gravity Model of Trade 
OCA: Optimum Currency Area
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Introduction 
On the first day of January 1999, the Euro was officially launched. It was adopted by eleven out of the 
then fifteen EU members, with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden retaining their national 
currencies, and Greece joining two years later, in 2001. At first the Euro existed merely as an electronic 
currency, being only used for banking operations, but, as the new coins and banknotes were printed, it 
gradually replaced the previous national currencies of member states. By 2002, it was the only currency 
in physical circulation accepted for official payments. Since then, the economic successes and failures of 
the Eurozone have been the subject of countless academic papers. This academic interest correlates 
positively with the importance such a topic has for the lives of millions of European citizens. 
All the questions that can be asked about the Euro surround a fundamental one: Is the Eurozone, through 
its several iterations, an Optimum Currency Area (OCA)? This OCA concept, first outlined by Robert A. 
Mundell in 1961, has been influential in most academic contentions regarding Currency Unions (CU), 
since the transition from the Bretton Woods to the International Flexible Exchange Rate System, to the 
current Eurozone debates. Essentially, the OCA theory contends that, to benefit from the economic 
advantages a CU provides, candidates must exhibit suitable economic characteristics to mitigate the 
disadvantage of losing their independent monetary policies. 
In 1998, Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose put forth a fresh new perspective on the subject. They 
proposed that the criteria for CU membership are endogenous, i.e., that if a country’s candidacy did not 
fulfil all requirements, these would eventually be attained after the country joined the CU. The authors’ 
reasoning was based on two assumptions: 1st) when two countries adopt the same currency, their trade 
relations grow; 2nd) this growth increases the symmetry of business cycles. In their 1998 study, they found 
empirical evidence for a positive and statistically significant correlation between trade intensity and 
business cycle symmetry: an increase in trade between two countries helps to synchronise economic 
activity between them, mitigating the effect of asymmetric demand shocks. The difficulty in addressing 
these shocks is the most important drawback of CU membership, due to the impossibility of having a 
different monetary policy for each member state.  
Classical trade theory (e.g., David Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin) would dictate that an increase in trade 
would result in increased sectorial specialization, and therefore, in more asymmetric shocks. But Frankel 
& Rose’s (1998) findings support the idea that it is intra-industrial trade, not inter-industrial, that prevails 
among most trade ties. By the simple virtue of CU membership, increased intra-industrial trade would, 
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over time, synchronize the business cycles of the candidate country with the other member states. This 
argument wraps up into a nice self-fulfilling prophecy: due to the endogeneity of the OCA criteria, entry 
into a CU is therefore justified ex post, rather than ex ante, as all previous literature defended. 
To EU policymakers, this new take on the OCA theory gave scientific validity to the political end goal they 
had been striving for more than 40 years: the culmination of European economic integration into a 
monetary union, the Euro. Although some economists doubted that all member states exhibited suitable 
economic conditions for membership in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
hypothesis that these conditions could be attained after joining - and that the single currency would 
function better in the future, rather than in the immediate present – seemed to proselytise most sceptics. 
The 2008 Financial Crisis, and the subsequent Great Recession, vindicated the most hardcore sceptics. 
The contrast of the recovery speed of member states was stark: while in 2010 the German Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) went up by 4.1%, the worst was still to come for Greece, with its GDP plunging 
9.1% the next year. With such asymmetric economic performance, a single monetary policy did not serve 
all members states well: the peripheric countries were forced to “tighten their belts” and engage in 
internal devaluation, as they did not have the option to devalue their own currency. The social and political 
strife that resulted from the harsh economic policies dictated by the European authorities took its tool in 
the minds of people from countries like Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain. The 2010’s saw a rise in 
Euroscepticism, both in public perception, as well as in political movements, with the most visible example 
being the Brexit campaign to withdraw the UK from the EU in 2016. But Euroscepticism is not limited to 
public discontent and political posturing. Prominent economists also speak out against the Euro, with 
Paul Krugman (2013, p. 439) calling the Eurozone “an economic trap”. 
As a master’s student, my primary motivation for choosing this topic as my thesis subject was to better 
understand the academic positions for and against the Euro. This motivation was spurred by the 
unexpected result of the Brexit vote in 2016, as well as several ideological disagreements with friends. 
Asking if the Eurozone is an OCA in 2020 seems like a pointless question. If the business cycles of 
Germany and Greece are anything to go by, Frankel & Rose were completely wrong: not only they did not 
get more synchronized, but also the fact that Greeks could not decide their own monetary policy made 
their bad situation even worse. Of all the literature that I read to write this study, the endogeneity of the 
OCA criteria hypothesis seemed like the hardest one to believe, even more so after the Great Recession. 
Thus, I decided to re-do Frankel & Rose’s original study, but with current data, to check if their conclusions 
hold up to the test of time. 
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Research Objectives 
This study aims to replicate Frankel & Rose’s (1998) methodology. The intent is not to adopt the most 
structurally sound model to produce results that consider the “big picture” of the relationship between 
business cycle synchronization and trade intensity. Instead, like Frankel & Rose, the aim is strictly 
empirical, with the goal of identifying the qualitative aspect of the relationship (signal). That is sufficient 
to draw a conclusion on what type of trade is more prevalent inside EMU: intra-industrial or inter-industrial. 
This study cannot offer an insight into the qualitative aspect of the relationship (i.e. how much do business 
cycles get synchronized when trade intensity goes up by, say, 1%). 
Summing up, there are three objectives: 
• To estimate the effect EMU has had on trade; 
• To provide intuition to the relationship between trade intensity and business cycle 
synchronization; 
• To compare the results with the surrounding academic literature. 
With the benefit of hindsight, several methodological improvements are adopted. The dataset used is 
dyadic, with a span of twenty-five years, from 1990 to 2015, covering twenty-nine, mostly industrialized, 
countries.  
This study is organized into the following sections: section 1 briefly explores the history of money and the 
concept of Optimum Currency Area; section 2 is dedicated to explaining the work of Frankel & Rose 
(1998): their Endogeneity Hypothesis and methodology; section 3 lists the most important methodological 
advances since Frankel & Rose (1998); section 4 presents a brief statistical description of the dataset 
used in this study; section 5 covers the methodology of this study; section 6 reports and discusses the 
results and finally the conclusions are presented in section 7. 
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1. Brief History of Money and of the Optimum Currency Area 
Theory 
Membership in a Currency Union is one of the most complex and definitive decisions a country can ever 
take. 
The term “Optimum Currency Area” was first coined by Robert Mundell in 1961. In his paper A Theory 
of Optimum Currency Areas, Mundell asks: “What is the appropriate domain of a currency area?”. We 
can state it differently by asking: what is the size that optimizes the beneficial effects of a currency area? 
If pressed for a response, the reader might be tempted to say that the national level is the most adequate 
one, as that is the reality we have grown up in. Most countries in the world (with the notable exception of  
the Eurozone countries, as well as the CFA Franc and East Caribbean Currency Union countries, and 
some other very small countries) have a money of their own, and relinquishing control over it is generally 
seen as an unfavourable loss of national sovereignty. 
Money, since the dawn of human society, has served three main purposes: a means of payment, a unit 
of account, and a store of value. Because of its universal acceptance (in the immediate geographical 
vicinity) people could trade much more easily, using money as an intermediary of exchanges rather than 
directly trading good-for-good. This would make value and price comparisons much simpler, as each 
good’s value was first evaluated in relation to the currency (price), and then compared with other good’s 
evaluations of their own (prices). It would also deal away with the inefficiency of direct trade. A person 
who wanted to trade apples for oranges had to find someone who was willing to sell the oranges he/she 
wanted, but also buy the apples he/she was offering. That is to say, the double coincidence of wants is 
a precondition for barter. 
Money, both as minted coins and later as paper based promissory notes and banknotes, gave people an 
universally accepted mean of payment, in the sense that they could buy all the goods they could want, 
from whoever was selling them, using only money. On top of that, money’s sole physical use was as a 
method of payment. This was another leap forward, compared to (at the time) existing commodity-based 
currencies such as salt and precious metals. These commodities were often used for other purposes, 
and not solely as currency, e.g. if you were a roman legionary in the time of Julius Caesar, you would 
literally salt your food with your hard-earned salarium (salary), as you would be payed in salt. 
If money has revolutionized the way how humans exchange goods and services with one another, why 
restrict it to a single country? Why not let a single currency rule the world? To answer this question, we 
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will explore an hypothetical scenario, drawn by Mundell (1961). Suppose that countries A and B are in a 
currency union and in macro-economic equilibrium. Also assume that labour mobility and wage flexibility 
are non-existent. An asymmetric shock shifts part of the demand for country B’s goods to A’s. The 
decreased demand will result in increased unemployment in B. In country A, the increased demand for 
its goods will shift its price upward, raising inflation. No worker from country B is able to move to country 
A to find a new job, and no worker from country A will accept lower wages to keep the inflation at bay.  
Monetary policy would be the most useful tool to restore equilibrium. The alternative would be an internal 
system of payment transfers between country A and B, but, since such a system requires strong political 
integration (and will), it is not a very pragmatic solution. If country B had its own currency, independent 
of country A, it could devalue its own money and make its goods cheaper and more competitive in country 
A’s markets. Meanwhile, country A could adopt a contractionary monetary policy, and prevent its internal 
prices from rising too much. This would result in increased demand for country B’s goods, which would 
control the rise of unemployment, and in the reduction of the price of country A’s goods (due to increased 
competition from B), containing inflation. 
But countries A and B cannot conduct their own independent monetary policies. They are in a currency 
union (and have to share the same policy). To restore equilibrium to the economies of both countries, the 
central bank must pursue two different and mutually exclusive strategies: if it prioritises price stability, 
inflation in country A will be contained, but at the cost of increased unemployment in country B; if it 
pursues a full employment policy, the unemployment in country B will be controlled, but inflation in 
country A will rise even more. This is the dilemma of currency unions: they are desirable due to the 
reduction in information and transaction costs, making money more effective in its function, but impose 
a common monetary policy on its members, which at times can’t attain a pareto efficient solution, i.e., it 
can’t improve the situation in one country without making the situation in another country worse. Because 
of this, the whole world is not an optimum currency area. 
If we can’t have one single world encompassing currency, how many should we have? One per country? 
One per regional district? One per city? Well, we can’t have too many. To quote Mundell (1961, p. 662): 
“In a hypothetical world in which the number of currencies equalled the number of commodities, the 
usefulness of money in its roles of unit of account and medium of exchange would disappear, and trade 
might just as well be conducted in terms of pure barter”. We don’t want money to be ineffective in its 
functions, otherwise we wouldn’t be using it. With this in mind, we can redefine the original question: 
what makes a currency area “optimal”? What is the ideal balance between the efficiency of money and 
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macroeconomic equilibrium? McKinnon (1963) defines the optimum currency area (henceforth 
abbreviated as OCA) as an area where a single currency can best accomplish three often conflicting 
objectives: maintaining full employment; maintaining the stability of internal prices; and balancing 
international payments. 
In the early 1960’s, the time of Mundell’s writing, some of the most important currencies in terms of 
world trade, like the British Pound, the French Franc, and German Mark,  were all pegged to the US Dollar 
at arbitrarily set values. The dollar itself was pegged to the value of gold. Other smaller currencies were 
indirectly pegged to the USD as well, through the pound, the franc and the mark. This was known as the 
Bretton Woods System. Although it provided price stability, and countries had a limited control over their 
own monetary policy (they could devaluate it up to 10% against the dollar, unless the IMF allowed for 
more), each country still had its own currency, which meant that prices of foreign goods still had to be 
estimated with the help of exchange rates, and physical coins and banknotes still had to be converted for 
international payments. 
Mundell’s original 1961 paper was a response to Friedman (1953), who argued for a flexible exchange 
rate system as a means of overcoming the limitations of the Bretton Woods system. For Friedman, an 
international exchange rate system where every country allowed their currency’s value to freely float on 
monetary markets was desirable, as that would make adjustments to economic shocks automatic. The 
central banks no longer needed to adjust the value of the currency to attain macroeconomic equilibrium, 
the adjustment would be determined by market forces. Recalling Mundell’s scenario, if the countries A 
and B have monetary independence, instead of adopting a monetary policy to follow their own specific 
strategies, they instead accept the exchange rate that is determined by monetary market investors. If an 
asymmetric shock occurs, shifting the demand for the goods of country B to the goods of country A, 
investors lose trust in the value of country B’s currency, and buy more currency from A. Country A’s 
currency appreciates against country B’s, and the rest follows from the previous example: macroeconomic 
equilibrium is restored. 
The validity of Friedman’s argument is taken as a given by Mundell. He does not dispute the idea that the 
value of a currency be determined in an international monetary market. His contention is at what level 
should currencies be allowed to float. While Friedman argued that every country should have its own 
currency and let it float, Mundell stated that currencies should float at the regional level instead. Without 
further context, the reader might mistakenly assume that Mundell is arguing here that every internal 
division of every single country should have its own currency, e.g., every single state of the United States, 
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or every single country inside the United Kingdom. He is not. For Mundell, a “region” is an economic 
area with characteristics that are suitable for a single currency to operate in. The United States, which is 
a country, would be considered a region by Mundell. But why does he do this? Why separate the country 
from the “region”? Because for him, the combination of countries that composed (then) Western Europe 
could also be a region. The label of “country” encompasses giants such as the USA and the (then) USSR, 
as well as Malta, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, etc. The economic conditions within these countries dictate different 
policies: while some should freely float their currencies (like the USA), others are too small to do that, 
and are better off pegging their currency or joining a CU with their closest neighbours. For Mundell what 
determines the desirability of a currency is not national identity, but economic feasibility.  
So, what are the conditions that befit the “region” (or OCA) Mundell refers to? These are the most 
important four: 
• Mobility of Factors 
• Wage Flexibility 
• Fiscal Integration 
• Openness 
• Business Cycle Synchronization  
A high mobility of factors allows workers and capital to move from regions suffering an economic downturn 
into regions that are growing. This softens the effects of asymmetric demand shocks and reduces de 
burden of readjustment on the central bank. As Mundell (1961, p. 663) puts it: “…the world can be 
divided into regions within each of which there is factor mobility and between which there is factor 
immobility…”. Labour mobility is especially important, as workers moving away from areas that lost 
demand and finding new jobs in others helps to control the unemployment rate. The less border and 
language barriers exist, the more mobile the workforce will be. Wage flexibility (see Friedman, 1953) also 
contributes to the mitigation of demand shocks, by shifting the burden of readjustment towards worker’s 
wages. However, we should always be mindful of Keynes (1936): people are extremely unwilling to accept 
cuts to their nominal earnings (sticky wages), more so than their real earnings (money illusion).  
Fiscal Integration (Kenen, 1969) differs from the previous two conditions in the sense that it is not an 
automatic stabilizer: it requires action on the part of political leaders to develop policies that correct 
macroeconomic imbalances, i.e., transfer funds from regions that have increased demand to those that 
lost demand. The higher the fiscal integration, the more funds can be allocated, allowing for the correction 
 Empirical study on the Endogeneity of the OCA Criteria: A post EMU analysis  
17 
of shocks of greater magnitude. However, depending on the prevailing attitude of politicians and the 
people in general, this can be a politically contentious issue at times. 
McKinnon (1963) states that openness also plays a role in determining the domain of an OCA. Openness 
is a measure of how open to foreign trade a country (or region) is: the greater the weight of foreign trade 
on total GDP, the more open it is. In a big economy, where most of the goods needed by the people are 
domestically produced, the liquidity of money is safeguarded internally by pegging its value to the value 
of these goods (measured by the Consumer Price Index), and externally by allowing it to float. But, if most 
goods in an economy come from foreign trade, as is the case for many small economies, allowing the 
currency to float can be dangerous for internal price stability. It is much more helpful to peg the value of 
the domestic money to the value of those foreign goods, i.e., to the currency of the most important trade 
partners. McKinnon (1963, p. 719) argues: “if we move across the spectrum from closed to open 
economies, flexible exchange rates become both less effective as a control device for external balance 
and more damaging to internal price-level stability”, and defends: “to maintain the liquidity value of 
individual currencies for small areas, a fixed exchange rate system is necessary”. The main giveaway of 
this is that the more two regions trade with each other, the better they are served by a single currency. 
In a line of thinking similar to Mundell, we can say: the world can be divided into regions within each of 
which there is significant trade and between which there are limited trade interactions. 
Although not considered by Mundell, there is a consensus among more recent authors that business 
cycle synchronization is another crucial factor for the optimality of an OCA. The rationale is that if countries 
have similar business cycles, asymmetric (or idiosyncratic) demand shocks are less prevalent, and the 
need for independent monetary policies isn’t as great. If all countries in a CU are experiencing a recession, 
an expansionary monetary policy applied by the central bank will serve all countries well. The same is 
true if they are booming, and the central bank applies a contractionary monetary policy. 
Determining if a country, group of countries, or other type of economic area exhibits the conditions 
described above, so as to be considered an OCA, is for Mundell an empirical question. 
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Table 1: Optimum Currency Area Theory  
Optimum Currency Areas 
Objectives Advantages Disadvantages Conditions/Criteria 
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• Mobility of 
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2. The Endogeneity Hypothesis of the OCA Criteria 
The Theory 
Writing more than 35 years after Mundell’s A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, Jeffrey A. Frankel and 
Andrew K. Rose would put forth an argument that contested the assumption that, before joining a CU, 
countries had to exhibit suitable economic conditions to do so. Before Mundell, Meade (1957) had stated 
that the conditions for a common currency in Western Europe did not yet exist. Scitovsky (1958) argued 
otherwise, favouring a common currency because it would induce a greater degree of capital mobility, 
but stressed that steps still had to be taken to make labour more mobile and facilitate supranational 
employment policies. The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, published in 1998, broke 
away from this line of thinking. In it, Frankel & Rose (1997, p. 1) contend that “a naive examination of 
historical data gives a misleading picture of a country’s suitability for entry into a CU, since the OCA 
criteria are endogenous”.  
This argument is essentially an application of the “Lucas Critique”, as outlined in the 1976 paper 
Econometric policy evaluation: A critique, by Robert Lucas Jr.. In the mid 1970’s, policy decisions were 
based on inferences withdrawn from large-scale macroeconomic models. These models were not 
structural, i.e., policy invariant. They were based on the Keynesian macroeconomic approach, which 
lacked a dynamic foundation based on microeconomics (i.e. micro-foundations). As a result, whenever 
major policy changes occurred, which affected economic agents on a structural level, the model’s 
assumptions would not necessarily be in line with reality. To compound the problem, the data used in 
those econometric models was highly aggregated. Aggregating data is the practice of grouping together 
a large number of observations into a single aggregated observation, to save digital storage space (which 
is at a premium today, and even more so in the 1970’s). The properties of the aggregated observation 
would be averages of the properties of all the individual observations that composed it, losing valuable 
information specific to individual economic agents. 
In Lucas own words (1976, p. 279): “Given that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal 
decision rules of economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in 
the structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will systematically 
alter the structure of econometric models.”. From this we can understand that relations that appear to 
hold, such as the relation between unemployment and inflation (Phillips Curve), could change in response 
to changes in economic policy”. The Lucas Critique therefore argues that it is naive to try to predict the 
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effects of a change in economic policy entirely on the basis of relationships observed in historical data 
(especially highly aggregated data), because existing models were not structural, and could lead to 
misleading conclusions. 
Frankel & Rose (1998) apply the Lucas critique to the late 1990’s discussion on the upcoming European 
Monetary Union (EMU). On a separate (but interesting) note, academic interest in the OCA theory 
coincides with the discussion on the implementation of flexible exchange rates (before and during the 
downfall of the Bretton Woods system), and the creation of the Euro. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
contributions to the OCA theory were scarce. So, the conventional wisdom of the 1990’s was the same 
of the 1960’s: countries should join a CU only if they exhibited certain economic characteristics (that 
resembled Mundell’s “region”): factor mobility; wage flexibility; fiscal integration; openness and business 
cycle correlation. Frankel & Rose’s 1998 empirical analysis focusses on the relationship between the last 
two and finds a positive and economically significant relationship between the intensity of trade between 
two countries, and the synchronization of their business cycles. This gave empirical validity to the 
endogeneity argument of OCA criteria, that they previously put forth the year before (Frankel & Rose, 
1997). The argument states that both of these criteria are endogenous: the correlation of business cycles 
is endogenous with respect to trade integration, while trade integration depends on policy, and gravity (as 
defined in the Gravity Model of Trade, to be explored later in this section). 
The authors reason (Frankel & Rose, 1998, p. 22): “some countries may appear, on the basis of historical 
data, to be poor candidates for EMU entry. But EMU entry per se, for whatever reason, may provide a 
substantial impetus for trade expansion; this in turn may result in more highly correlated business cycles. 
That is, a country is more likely to satisfy the criteria for entry into a CU ex post rather than ex ante”. 
Since the authors find empirical evidence to back up their words, in practice this means that if countries 
join EMU, regardless if they exhibit ex ante the necessary economic conditions, they will satisfy those 
conditions ex post by virtue of being a member of the EMU. After a country joins the EMU, increased 
trade with Eurozone members will, over time, contribute to the convergence of the business cycles. In 
turn, this will reduce the need for independent monetary policy to contain inflationary pressures and 
alleviate social problems, making the member countries more closely resemble an OCA. 
If broken down, Frankel & Rose’s endogeneity argument has two assumptions:  
• 1st) countries that join a CU will experience growth in trade with other member states;  
• 2nd) that growth in trade will be mostly intra-industrial (because of the positive relationship between 
trade and business cycle correlation) and will not result in an increase in sector specialization. 
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The first assumption seems, theoretically, uncontroversial: the use of the same currency by two countries 
makes trade easier due to reduced information and transaction costs, so they will trade more with each 
other. Andrew K. Rose (2000) affirms that this growth in trade could be as high as 300% Shortly after, 
Glick & Rose (2002) present a much smaller estimate, of around 50%. A more recent reassessment of 
this paper (Glick & Rose, 2016) reaches a similar estimate of 50%, but with an updated and more 
parsimonious methodology. However, no empirical consensus exists. We will explore some of the reasons 
as to why this is further in section 3. 
The second assumption, unlike the first, does not enjoy a theoretical consensus because it directly 
contradicts classical economic theory: an increase in trade between two countries is expected to lead to 
greater specialization of their economies, in order to maximise their comparative advantages (Ricardo, 
1817). This means that if demand shocks occur, it is more likely that they will be asymmetric than 
symmetric, increasing the need for independent monetary policy. From this divide, we can establish two 
camps: Frankel & Rose (1998) on one side defending the intra-industrial trade hypothesis (based mainly 
on their empirical findings), and Krugman & Veneables (1995) on the other, remaining loyal to classic 
economic theory. There are plenty of empirical studies to support both sides. 
De Grauwe & Vanhaverbeke (1991) find that in Europe, asymmetric shocks tend to be more prevalent 
between the regions of a given country, than between countries themselves. This posits that the major 
obstacle preventing countries from uniting under a common currency can also be observed between the 
regions that compose them. 
Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1993) analyse data on output and prices for 11 EEC member states to extract 
information on aggregate supply and demand shocks using a vector autoregression (VAR) decomposition. 
They find that shocks are more idiosyncratic across EEC countries than across United States regions, 
indicating that it would be more difficult to operate a monetary union in the EEC than in the US. However, 
a core of EEC countries (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg), experiences 
shocks of similar magnitude and cohesion as the US regions. The remaining EEC countries are in a 
“periphery” where the magnitude of shocks is considerably higher. 
Clark & Wincoop (2001, p. 59) also document that “business cycles of U.S. Census regions are 
substantially more synchronized than those of European countries. Data from regions within European 
countries confirm a European border effect – within-country correlations are substantially larger than 
cross country correlations”. This “Border Effect” means that it is significantly easier to trade inside a 
given country (between its regions), than internationally. 
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Despite this border effect being considerably stronger for Europe than for the US, Fatas (1997) finds that 
it has been on the decline. From 1966 to 1992, the correlation of incomes between countries in Europe 
has increased, while the correlation between regions within these countries has diminished. Fatas (1997, 
p. 749) explains: “These results are probably caused by the combination of two factors. First, European 
integration and increased trade is creating more cross-border links instead of favouring specialization at 
the country level. Second, additional coordination in economic policies is increasing cross country 
relations”. Angeloni & Dedola’s (1999) findings are also in line with Fatas, with intra-area correlations of 
output, stock market indices and aggregate prices having increased in the 1990’s. 
Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1997) operationalise the OCA theory by constructing an OCA index for European 
countries. Comparing the movements in the index from 1987 to 1995, and using Germany as the 
reference country, they identify three groups of countries: 1) converged countries – Austria, Belgium, 
Ireland, The Netherlands, and Switzerland; 2) converging countries: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain , and 
Sweden; 3) other countries – Denmark, Finland, France, Norway and the UK. They also find that the 
countries which had the greatest increase in bilateral trade have also experienced the greatest increase 
in their readiness for monetary integration. These results support Frankel and Rose’s endogeneity of the 
OCA criteria hypothesis. 
Hallet & Piscitelli (2000) study the effects of a single monetary policy when asymmetries exist. They find 
that monetary transmissions and private sector asset holdings, when significantly asymmetric, destabilise 
the business cycle in ways that cannot be corrected by deficit constrained fiscal policies. 
Giovanni & Levchenko (2010), using a large cross-country industry-level panel dataset of manufacturing 
production and trade, find evidence that higher bilateral trade in an individual sector increases both the 
comovement within the sector between trading countries, as well as the comovement between that sector 
and the rest of the economy of the trading partner. 
Calderon et al. (2007) distinguish the effect that trade intensity has on business cycle correlations 
between industrial and developing countries and find that this effect is substantially smaller for developing 
countries. The authors suggest that this divergence is explained by differences in the patterns of trade 
specialization between countries. 
Giannone et al. (2008), writing almost a decade after the EMU came into effect, find that it has not 
affected the historical characteristics of member countries’ business cycles and their cross-correlations. 
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Enders et al. (2013) also support this finding, claiming that there is little evidence that the EMU has 
systematically changed the European business cycle. 
In contrast, Silvestre & Mendonça (2007) find a positive and statistically significant correlation between 
trade intensity and business cycle comovement. But, when dividing their sample by sub-periods, this 
relationship becomes insignificant after 1986. This happens despite the comovement between countries’ 
incomes continuing to get more synchronised, suggesting that other forces beyond trade are contributing 
to the synchronization of business cycles. 
Aguiar-Conraria & Soares (2011) study the comovement of business cycles of several members of the 
EU through wavelet analysis. The authors (2011, p. 19) defend that “Wavelet analysis is particularly well 
suited to study business cycles, because it estimates the spectrum as a function of time, revealing how 
the different periodic components of the time-series change over time.”. They find that business cycle 
comovement is highly dependent on geographical adjacency. Germany and France form the “core” of the 
Eurozone’s business cycle, being the most synchronized with all other members-states. Other countries 
gravitate around these two, with Spain and Austria’s business cycles being synchronized with the 
European business cycle by virtue of being synchronized with the French and German business cycles, 
respectively. Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Finland represent the “periphery”: not showing any 
statistically significant correlation with the remainder of Euro-12’s business cycles.  
This distinction between core and periphery is also recognized by Caporale et al. (2015). The authors 
show that the relationships between trade intensity and output synchronization are positive and 
statistically significant for most European countries, but peripheral countries exhibit a declining effect over 
time, supporting the specialization model of Krugman (1993). This results in a divergence between core 
and periphery countries, and the authors call for change in the European Governance to preserve the 
future stability of the EMU. 
 
Although finding a positive and significant correlation between trade and business cycle correlation, 
Frankel & Rose (1998) do not comment on the direction of causality between these two variables. They 
do not claim that it is increased trade that causes more synchronous business cycles, nor vice versa. 
They also do not comment on the possible simultaneity problem of both variables affecting each other. 
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The Praxis 
Frankel & Rose’s original 1998 methodology employed a Two Stage Linear Least Squares (2SLS) model, 
to study the correlation of trade intensity and business cycle comovement. This approach is preferred to 
a standard OLS, due to the endogeneity of trade intensity. The 2nd stage of their model was defined as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑣, 𝑠)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 (𝑤)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑣, 𝑠) denotes the comovement of business cycles and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒(𝑤) the trade intensity. 
Each observation in their dataset consisted of dyadic country pairs. Real GDP, total employment, the 
unemployment rate, and an industrial production index are used as variables of economic activity, to 
measure the symmetry of business cycles. Bilateral trade, weighted by total trade and total output, are 
used as variables for trade intensity, as specified by the following formulas: 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡)






where 𝑤𝑡 denotes the trade intensity, 𝑋 the exports, 𝑀 the imports, and 𝑌 the real GDP. 
Capitalizing on the (then) relatively recent academic interest in the Gravity Model of Trade, Frankel & Rose 
adopt this model as the 1st stage of their 2SLS: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒(𝑤)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜑𝛼 + 𝜑 log(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜑𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜑𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡 
where distance, border, and common language are used as Instrumental Variables (IV’s) to control the 
endogeneity of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒(𝑤). The predicted values of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒(𝑤) are then used to calculate 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 or 
𝑤𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 in the 2nd stage. 
Today, the Gravity Model of Trade (henceforth abbreviated GMT) is one of the most used models in 
econometrics, with Krugman (1997, p. 42) calling it an example of “Social Physics”. But, in the early to 
mid-1990’s, the idea that gravity could explain the trade flows of the world’s economies was one that 
most researchers did not took seriously. According to Head & Mayer (2014, p. 5) “one of the barriers to 
mainstream acceptance was the lingering perception that gravity equations were more physics analogy 
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than economic analysis”. Despite this, researchers “admitted” the importance of the GMT when they 
“realized there was a surprisingly large amount of missing trade, and admitted that gravity was one way 
to measure and explain it” (Head & Mayer, 2014 p. 5). This idea of missing trade was first introduced by 
Trefler (1995). 
The GMT, like its physics counterpart, has rules for size and distance. A greater size means more trade, 
and a greater distance means less. More specifically: 
• exports rise proportionately with the economic size of the destination; imports rise in proportion 
to the size of the economy of origin; 
• a strong negative relationship exists between physical distance and trade. 
Overall, the goal of Frankel & Rose is not to predict all the factors that affect business cycle 
synchronization. They were content with figuring out the sign of its relationship with trade intensity. They 
found this sign to be positive and statistically significant, and that was all they needed to support their 
endogeneity hypothesis. The meaning of this positive sign is that the type of trade more likely to be 
prevalent within the EMU is intra-industral, not inter-industrial, as classic theory would predict.     
 
3. Advancements in Empirical Methodology 
To recap, in section 1 we reviewed the history of the OCA concept, and in section 2 we learned about the 
Endogeneity Hypothesis and the methodology employed by Frankel & Rose (1998). In this section, we 
will explore the methodological advancements that came after their work. The first four subsections deal 
with advancements on the 1st stage (the gravity equation). As the EMU came into effect in 1999, most 
posterior studies have a heavy focus on estimating the trade generating effect of the Euro. Their results 
provide a valuable insight into the validity of the 1st assumption of the Endogeneity Hypothesis. On the 
other hand, few studies try to test the validity of the 2nd assumption. The final, fifth subsection covers this 
lack of advancements on the 2nd stage. 
 
The Multilateral Resistance Problem (Anderson & Wincoop, 2003) 
Multilateral Resistance is a term coined by Anderson & Wincoop (2003). To grasp this concept, the reader 
must also understand what a “Trade Barrier” is. In the context of the multilateral resistance problem, the 
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term trade barrier is synonymous with “Border Effect”: the effect a national border has on trade, holding 
other factors such as gravity and CU constant. It stems from common sense that two regions within a 
country trade more with each other than two regions in different countries, ceteris paribus. The border 
effect measures just how much less regions between countries trade with each other (international trade) 
than regions within a country (intranational trade). Multilateral resistance is essentially a theoretical 
average border effect, encompassing the trade barriers with all trading partners of a given country. 
Through the exploration of the micro-foundations of trade (beyond the scope of this study), Anderson & 
Wincoop (2003) find that, as multilateral resistance for a given country increases, the border effects for 
its current trading partners decrease, in relation to the border effects of non-trading partners. In proper 
English, this means that a country that doesn’t trade much (high multilateral resistance), is more likely 
to trade more with its existing (or preferred) trade partners than a simple estimation controlling for gravity 
would predict. This unpredicted “excess” trade results in a “lack” of predicted trade with partner countries 
with limited trade ties. Because of this, previous gravity equations (including Frankel & Rose’s) were 
flawed due to omitted variables that captured this multilateral resistance effect. Ignoring this problem is 
what Baldwin & Taglioni (2007) call the “Gold Medal Mistake” of GMT estimation. 
There are two common ways to try and correct this mistake: one is the use of a Fixed Effects Model (FE), 
the other is the use of an OLS with Country Dummies. 
A Fixed Effects Model (FE) helps to control the endogeneity of omitted variables, because it eliminates 
part of the error term. In this respect, it is similar to a First Differences Model (FD), where a first differences 
transformation deducts the value of the previous period to every actual value in a dataset. In practical 
terms, this results in the elimination of all non-varying elements in a dataset, including the error term. 
Only the idiosyncratic part of the error remains. 
𝑥𝐹𝐷 = 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1 
In the FE model, all non-varying variables are eliminated, and variables with constant variation over time 
(e.g. a dummy for CU) are greatly distorted. But, instead of a first differences transformation, a fixed 
effects transformation is applied instead. This transformation subtracts the average of all actual values to 
each actual value. It is a more efficient method when the idiosyncratic error is serially uncorrelated. 
𝑥𝐹𝐸 = 𝑥 − ?̅? 
Although both FE and FD models are effective at controlling endogeneity, the transformations they apply 
change the data considerably. Variables that are constant over time, e.g. dummy for common language, 
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are eliminated. Variables that change at a constant rate over time are also greatly distorted. Take as an 
example the first differencing of a GMT with a dummy for membership in a CU. A country that never joins 
a CU will always have 0 as an actual value for this dummy. A country that has always been in a CU will 
also always have 1 − 1 = 0. This dummy will only take the value 1 when a country joins a CU (1 − 0 =
1), or when it leaves (0 − 1 = −1). So, the nature of our original question changes from a cross 
sectional, to a time series one: we are no longer asking “How much more do countries in a CU trade than 
those outside?”, but rather “How much does joining a CU increase trade in the 1st year?”. In the latter 
case, we can clearly identify if results are significant with the application of a test for non-linearities and 
structural breaks (the Chow test).  
As to the FE model, the interpretation of its coefficients is the same as in OLS. But the data is still distorted 
by the fixed effects transformation. The alternative to the FE, in the context of the GMT, is employing 
Country Dummies in a standard OLS. Instead of eliminating the multilateral resistance effects from the 
estimation, the Country Dummies isolate them in a binary variable for each specific country. 
Although both Fixed Effects and OLS with Country Dummies are effective at eliminating a substantial part 
of the multilateral resistance bias, their employment does not completely solve the problem. Both 
methods successfully control the time-invariant part of the bias, but, as Baldwin & Taglioni (2007) point 
out, multilateral resistance also changes over time. This time-variant part is captured by the perturbation 
term, so the results will still be biased, although not as much. 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) as well as Head & Mayer (2014) propose the use of a Least Squares with 
time-varying country Dummy Variables Model (LSDV) as the definitive solution. This model is exemplified 
in Glick & Rose (2016): 
𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛾𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 + {𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑡} + {𝜓𝑖𝑗𝑡} + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the nominal value of bilateral exports from i to j at time t, 𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 is equal to 1 if 
countries i and j are in a CU, 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of controls (GDP, distance, common language, etc…), 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is a complete set of time-varying exporter dummy variables and 𝜓𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a complete set of time-varying 
importer dummy variables. There is a dummy for each country in the dataset, in each given year. Plus, 
dummies also distinguish if the country is importer/exporter in each given dyad. In total, the number of 
dummies will be: 
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) ∗ 2 
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As the reader can imagine, in very large datasets the number of dummies can be astronomical. 
Nevertheless, this is the best method known so far that controls multilateral resistance effects in their 
entirety, being therefore indispensable. The inclusion of a yearly component into the dummies, besides 
isolating the time-varying multilateral resistance effect, also corrects the “Bronze Medal Mistake” (Baldwin 
& Taglioni, 2007): inappropriate deflation of nominal trade flows. Using a single deflator for all trade flows 
(e.g. the US price index) ignores global trends in the inflation rates of other currencies. A set of year 
dummies solves this problem more effectively by capturing the effects of inflation, for each year.   
 
Measurement of Trade Intensity (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007) 
Recalling Frankel & Rose (1998), trade intensity is measured as an average of two one-way trade flows: 
exports from i to j (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) and exports from j to i (𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡): 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡)






Where 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents two-way trade weighted by total trade, and 𝑤𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents two-way trade 
weighted by GDP. Since 1998, most researchers using the GMT no longer apply weights to trade intensity, 
instead adopting variables such as the product of the dyad’s GDP, per capita GDP and Land Area as 






Although this was a very common approach to measuring trade intensity, Baldwin & Taglioni (2007) point 
out that most researchers commit the “Silver Medal Mistake”: computing the log of trade intensity after 
computing the average. Basically, they mistake the log of the average for the average of the logs.  
If the log of the average is calculated, instead of the average of the logs as it should be, serious problems 
can occur if trade is unbalanced. According to Baldwin & Taglioni (2007, p. 797) “…the error will not be 
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too bad for nations that have bilaterally balanced trade – in which case is close to unity – but it can be 
truly horrendous for nations with very unbalanced trade. In the real world, bilaterally unbalanced trade is 
a huge issue, especially for North-South trade flows.”. Mathematically, the sum of the logs is 
approximately the log of the sums, but the approximation gets worse as the two flows diverge. This will 
bias the results, resulting in an overestimated effect of a CU on trade. This bias is more severe in panel 
datasets.  
Essentially, the averaging should be done after taking the logs: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
2
 
It is reasonable to think that CIS (Cost, Insurance and Freight) import data is preferable over FOB (Free 
on Board) export data, because countries pay more attention to imports rather than exports when 
inspecting accounts, to avoid tariff fraud. But, since 1993, trade data is gathered from VAT (Value Added 
Tax) statistics for most European countries. Exporters are thus incentivized through VAT rebates to 
announce exports properly (and disguise imports). No consensus on the decision between the use of FOB 
or CIF data exists. 
 
The Small Datasets Problem (Rose, 2017) 
When estimating the effect EMU has on trade, Glick & Rose (2016) reach an estimate of about 50%, but 
they note that across other studies this estimation varies significantly. In a meta-analysis of the literature, 
Rose (2017) posits that most other researchers seem to reach a much smaller estimate, closer to 10%. 
Some even obtain negative estimates. The author points out that there are two interesting correlations: 
• the more years in a dataset, the higher the estimate; 
• the more countries in a dataset, the higher the estimate. 
The first had already been pointed out by Frankel (2010). The second is mostly due to omitted multilateral 
resistance effects. Most studies have less than 30 countries in their sample, the majority being rich and 
industrial ones. Rose (2016, p. 3) writes: “Dropping small and poor countries leads to biased estimates 
of these effects if small and poor countries have systematically different ‘trade resistance’, or if the trade 
resistance of large countries is reflected in trade with smaller countries. Intuitively, the fact that Germany 
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exports to small countries like Fiji is important in understanding German export prowess, but this 
information is lost if Fiji isn’t included in the sample of data.”. 
Simply put, Rose warns that if the effect EMU has on trade is to be estimated accurately, then a large 
dataset spanning a long-time frame and, most importantly, including as many countries as possible, 
should be employed. As multilateral resistance is a function of all bilateral trade barriers, there is no 
reason to omit countries from the dataset, as small or unimportant they may be. In fact, if this is done, 
the heterogeneity in multilateral resistance effects between big and small countries, and between 
developed and developing ones is lost, resulting in less accurate results. Rose (2016, p. 3) concludes: 
“As multilateral trade resistance is a function of all bilateral trade barriers, all trade partners should be 
included for the most accurate estimates”. 
 
Disaggregating CU’s (Eicher & Henn, 2011) 
Eicher & Henn (2011) emphasize the importance of disaggregating individual CU’s when studying their 
effects on trade. The intuition for this is quite straightforward: not all CU’s are the same. The EMU is not 
comparable to the East Caribbean Currency Union or the CFA Franc (the only 2 other formal currency 
unions in existence) because EMU countries are larger, richer, and the ECB pursues inflation targeting 
(Rose, 2016). In contrast, the East Caribbean Currency Union pegs its currency to the dollar, while the 
CFA Franc pegs it to the euro. Grouping them together into a single dummy variable will therefore lead to 
misleading results about the EMU’s effect on trade.  
Glick & Rose (2016) show this by calculating 3 different regressions of the GMT: one where CU’s are all 
aggregated, one where EMU is separated from all other CU’s, and one where all CU’s are disaggregated. 
In the first scenario, the point estimate is 0.63, while in the second it is 0.41 for EMU. This result does 
not change in the third scenario, implying that entry into the EMU expands trade by (𝑒0.41 − 1) ≈ 51%. 
This trade generating effect is larger for other currency unions in the second (0.75) and third scenarios, 
except for the East Caribbean Currency Union.  
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The 2nd Stage 
The 2nd stage of Frankel & Rose’s (1998) estimations has not received nearly as much attention as the 1st 
stage has, despite the authors calling for more research into omitted variables. To the best of this 
student’s knowledge very few studies attempt to replicate their methodology. 
The only study found was Silvestre & Mendoça (2007). It has some differences, mainly the way how trade 
intensity is calculated and the number of detrending filters applied, but the goal was equally limited: 
identify the signal of the relationship between trade and business cycle correlation. The authors state 
(2007, p. 6): “Obviously, many other factors beyond bilateral trade intensity play a role in cycles 
synchronization and in shock incidence or transmission, but the objective of this analysis is only to 
evaluate the trade effect and not trying to find all explanatory variables for business cycle correlation. In 
fact, though the statistical significance of the model, it has reduced explanatory power and 𝑅2 of the 
regressions are very low”. 
Let’s recall the assumptions of the Endogeneity Hypothesis: 1st) countries that join a CU will experience 
growth in trade with other member states; 2nd) that growth in trade will be mostly intra-industrial (because 
of the positive relationship between trade and business cycle correlation) and will not result in an increase 
in sector specialization. Both assumptions match perfectly with the 1st and 2nd stages of Frankel & Rose’s 
(1998) 2SLS model. Just as the 2nd stage equation depends on the 1st, the 2nd assumption depends on 
the 1st as well. If membership in a CU doesn’t result in increased trade, it is pointless to assume (for the 
endogeneity argument) that trade is positively correlated with business cycle synchronization, as 
membership in CU would make no difference in the rate of synchronization. Maybe the attention of 
researchers simply went in the direction of the first assumption, as we cannot build the rest of the 
argument if that one fails to hold. 
Another possible explanation for this apparent lack of interest is the limited value of this approach, in 
terms of knowledge gained. The empirical intuition for the relationship between business cycle correlation 
and trade, although very interesting, only accounts for the qualitative aspect (sign) of the relationship. It 
says nothing about the quantitative, i.e., how much an increase in trade correlates with business cycle 
synchronization. To find unbiased estimates of this quantitative aspect, there would be a need for a 
structurally sound model explaining most of the variation in business cycle correlations.  
One final possibility is that researchers attempted to adopted more “complete” methodologies, with 
proper micro-foundations. Frankel & Rose (1998, p. 6) admit that “Ideally, we would use a general 
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equilibrium model of international trade to derive testable hypothesis. … Creating such a model from 
scratch is beyond the limited scope of this (chiefly empirical) paper.”. Such a model, although requiring 
some more effort, would provide much more useful information, such as the quantitative aspect of the 
trade – business cycle synchronization relationship.  
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
The dataset employed in this study consists of dyadic panel data, and was manually compiled by the 
student. Trade data is retrieved from IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. GDP and industrial production 
data are retrieved from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Data for employment and unemployment 
are retrieved from OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.  
The dataset ranges from 1990 to 2015, and encompasses 29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES N mean 
   
landborder 21,112 0.0764 
seaborder 21,112 0.00360 
border 21,112 0.0800 
language 21,112 0.0665 
lanl_n 5 616.6 
isld_n 5 167.4 
eu90 11 147.5 
eu99 14 147.1 
eu08 19 358.3 
eu15 19 358.3 
euro99 10 150.2 
euro08 11 152.4 
euro15 12 217.7 
nafta90 2 133.5 
nafta99 3 180 
nafta08 3 180 
nafta15 3 180 
efta90 5 145.2 
efta99 2 144 
efta08 2 144 
efta15 2 144 
   
Source: Own computations. 
From table 2, basic statistics about the countries that compose the dataset can be observed. The total 
number of observations amounts to 21 112: 29 countries times 28 trading partners equals 812 country-
pairs; 812 dyads times 26 years equals 21 112 observations. Of these, 7.64% represent country-pairs 
that share a land border, and 0,36% represent country-pairs that share a sea border. This sea border 
refers to countries that, although not physically connected to each other by landmass, are nonetheless 
close in geographic terms (e.g. Australia and New Zealand) or connected by man-made tunnels/bridges 
(e.g. France and UK; Denmark and Sweden). The variable border is simply the sum of landborder with 
seaborder. About 8% of all the dyads represent geographically adjacent trading partners, and 6.65% 
represent countries with the same official language. Of these 29 countries, 5 are land-locked (i.e., are 
completely surrounded by other countries and therefore have no access to the sea) and another 5 are 
islands. 
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The remaining variables are dummies for membership in EU, Eurozone, NAFTA and EFTA, in the years 
1990, 1999, 2008 and 2015. It can be observed that the weight of countries belonging to trade blocks 
other than EU is relatively small: at their height, only 5 countries compose EFTA and 3 compose NAFTA. 
Nonetheless, in a universe of 29 countries, the weight of these trade agreements is too large to be ignored, 
especially when EU countries amount to about 1/3rd of the dataset in 1990 (11), and 2/3rds in 2015. All 
countries with membership in the Eurozone are EU members, but not all EU members use the Euro. Of 
the 14 EU member states in the sample, only 10 adopted the Euro in 1999. Although many countries 
joined the EU in later years (with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements being the most significant), only 2 
more adopted the Euro as of 2015. This means that, roughly, only half of the EU members use the Euro 
in the last period of the dataset. 
 
The following figures present an overview of the correlations of economic activity. Figures 1 through 3 
show real Gross Domestic Product correlation, 4 through 6 Industrial Production correlation, 7 through 9 
Employment correlation, and 10 through 12 Unemployment correlation. The data used in all these figures 
has been detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. 
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Figure 1: Box plot of GDP correlations for non-EU country pairs 
 
Figure 2: Box plot of GDP correlations for EU country pairs 
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Figure 3: Box plot of GDP correlations for Euro country pairs 
 
Figure 4: Box plot of IPI correlations for non-EU country pairs 
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Figure 5: Box plot of IPI correlations for EU country pairs 
 
Figure 6: Box plot of IPI correlations for Euro country pairs 
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Figure 7: Box plot of Total Employment correlations for non-EU country pairs 
 
Figure 8: Box plot of Total Employment correlations for EU country pairs 
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Figure 9: Box plot of Total Employment correlations for Euro country pairs 
 
Figure 10: Box plot of Unemployment Rate correlations for non-EU country pairs 
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Figure 11: Box plot of Unemployment Rate correlations for EU country pairs 
 
Figure 12: Box plot of Unemployment Rate correlations for Euro country pairs 
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Looking at the GDP, the trend is for correlations to decrease from the first to the second period and 
increase in the final third period. This is unlike all other measures of economic activity, whose correlations 
tend to increase in both the second and third periods. Eurozone countries are different, with correlations 
remaining either static or decreasing slightly from the second to the third period. 
When compared to non-EU countries, EU countries tend to show a higher average correlation, and, in the 
case of the Industrial Production Index, significantly less dispersion, suggesting that the economic sectors 
of European economies are more tightly integrated than those of the rest of the world. However, by the 
third period, this difference tends to dissipate. 
There are many outliers by the third period, which coincides with the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
Financial Crisis. Eurozone country pairs consistently show less outliers than EU or non-EU countries, but 
while the average correlation for these countries increased, it remained stagnant for the Eurozone. 
Compared to EU countries, no significant difference exists in the average correlation. This seems to 
indicate that, not only the Euro impact on business cycle correlation is indistinguishable from that of the 
EU, the Euro has actually hindered synchronization after the Great Recession of 2008. 
 
Figures 13 and 14 show the evolution of trade intensity through the dataset’s timeframe, for Euro and 
Non-Euro country pairs. To control for inflation, the exports of each base country in the dyad are divided 
by their nominal GDP.  This should give us an idea of the behaviour of real trade flows during the 
considered time period. Note that it is the weight of the exports towards the dyad’s partner country that 
is being measured, and not towards all Euro or Non-Euro partners as a whole. That is why the percentages 
are all very low (>0.03%): they account for the weight of a single trading partner. 
When comparing both figures, it is outright evident that Eurozone countries trade more with each other, 
as a percentage of their GDP’s, than non-members. The average weight of exports towards Eurozone 
members is always above 0.01%, while for non-members is always bellow 0.01%. In some years, the 
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Figure 13: Evolution of the Average Weight of Trade for non-Euro country pairs 
 
Figure 14: Evolution of the Average Weight of Trade for Euro country pairs 
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The weight of trade for Eurozone country pairs starts with a sharp rise in the first year, 1999, as expected. 
But that rise quickly diminishes to bellow 1999 levels before 2002, the year when the Euro fully replaced 
the previous currencies in the countries that adopted it. Despite the downward trend reversing in 2003, 
the weight of trade never surpassed 1999 levels. The impact of the 2008 financial crisis was also more 
pronounced when compared to non-Eurozone country pairs. 
 
5. Methodology 
The methodology employed in this study closely follows the one of Frankel & Rose (1998), but, with the 
benefit of hindsight, adopts several advancements. Nevertheless, this study has its own limitations and 
is not intended to be a thorough reassessment of the original work. It is more of an academic exercise, 
spurred by the student’s interest in the subject. The goals are three: 
• To estimate the effect EMU has had on trade; 
• To provide intuition to the relationship between trade intensity and business cycle 
synchronization; 
• To compare the results with the surrounding academic literature. 
To estimate the effect the Euro has had on trade, an approach similar to Glick & Rose (2002) is used, 
where bilateral trade is predicted through a GMT, both by OLS and FE. Unlike Glick & Rose (2002), the 
OLS estimation incorporates time and country dummies, partially controlling for multilateral resistance 
effects. To examine the business cycle synchronization – trade intensity relationship, this same GMT is 
used again as the 1st stage of a 2SLS, where the 2nd stage is identical to the one used by Frankel & Rose 
(1998). But, instead of having a measure of bilateral trade as its dependent variable, the 1st stage GMT 
has a measure of trade intensity. This is necessary, because bigger countries will have a larger volume 
of trade, but not necessarily a greater weight of trade in their economy, biasing the results of the 2nd stage. 
First, the natural logarithms of all variables (except unemployment rate) are computed, to capture their 
relative variation. Taking the advice of Baldwin & Taglioni (2007) into account, the averages of trade flows 
are calculated after computing their logs, avoiding the Silver Medal Mistake. Since no definitive choice 
can be made between using FOB or CIF data, an average of both measures is used to calculate each 
trade flow. Bilateral trade is therefore measured as: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋𝑗,𝑡
2
 
While trade intensity is measured as: 





• 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 denotes the average of FOB and CIF data regarding the nominal exports from country i to 
country j, during period t; 
• 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 denotes the average of FOB and CIF data regarding the nominal exports from country j to 
country i, during period t; 
• 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 denotes the nominal GDP of the base country; 
• 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗  denotes the nominal GDP of the partner country. 
After this, the variables are de-trended to exclude seasonal fluctuations of economic activity. Following 
the methodology of Frankel & Rose (1998), three de-trending techniques are employed: fourth differences, 
a quadratic time trend, and the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The measures of economic activity used are real 
GDP, two Industrial Production Indexes (one seasonally adjusted, the other unadjusted), Total 
Employment and the Unemployment Rate. 
After de-trending the variables, the next step is the computation of bilateral correlations of economic 
activity. To do this, the dataset must be divided into time periods: 1990 to 1998, 1999 to 2007, and 
2008 to 2015. With 29 countries in our dataset, the number of correlations will amount to 1218: 406 
(29*28/2) for each of the three periods. With 5 measures of economic activity and 3 de-trending 
techniques being used, a total of 5 ∗ 3 = 15 correlations will be estimated. 
The estimation of the effect of trade on business cycle synchronization is a two-step process, due to the 
endogeneity of trade. The first step is to predict trade flows using a GMT. This is done with the employment 
of two different models: the first is a GMT estimated by OLS with Country and Year dummies, the second 
is a GMT estimated by Fixed Effects. 
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The Gravity Model of Trade used is the following: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗/𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗)𝑡+𝛽3𝑙𝑛 (𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗) + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Where: 
• 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 denotes the average of the logarithm of two-way trade between i and j, at time t; 
• 𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗 denotes the product of real GDP of i and j; 
• 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗 denotes the product of the population of i and j; 
• 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗 denotes the product of the landmass of i and j; 
• 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗 denotes distance between the capitals of i and j; 
• 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗 is a dummy that denotes if i and j share a common language; 
• 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 is a dummy that denotes if i and j share a land or sea border; 
• 𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy denoting if both i and j are members of the European Union (or EEC), at time 
t; 
• 𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy denoting if both i and j are members of the Eurozone, at time t; 
• 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy denoting if both i and j are members of NAFTA, at time t; 
• 𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy denoting if both i and j are members of EFTA, at time t; 
• 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗 denotes the number of landlocked countries in the dyad (0, 1 or 2); 
• 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑗 denotes the number of island countries in the dyad (0, 1 or 2); 
• 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑗 is a dummy denoting if i ever colonized j, or vice-versa. 
• 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 designates the error term. 
 
In order to address the problems of inflation and multilateral resistance, Year and Country Dummies are 
used. It is possible to add them directly to the GMT, but, to avoid problems of multicollinearity, the 
dummies are first regressed on the residuals of a standard OLS estimation: 
𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = {𝜆𝑖,𝑗} + {𝜓𝑡} + 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Where: 
• 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the predicted residual of the GMT estimation by standard OLS; 
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• {𝜆𝑖,𝑗} represents a set of country dummies for all 29 countries in the dataset (=1 if country in 
dyad, =0 otherwise); 
• {𝜓𝑡} represents year dummies for all 26 years in the dataset; 
• 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 designates the error term that is not explained by multilateral resistance and inflation. 
After computing this auxiliary regression, the values for the dependent variable are predicted to create a 
new variable: mr_yd. The GMT is then estimated again using this variable, controling for the time-invariant 
multilateral resistance and common inflation effects that were previously part of the error term:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗/𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗)𝑡+𝛽3𝑙𝑛 (𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗) + 𝛽4ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝛽14𝑚𝑟_𝑦𝑑 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Where: 
• 𝑚𝑟_𝑦𝑑 represents controls for multilateral resistance and inflation; 
• 𝑎𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 designates the error term that is not explained by multilateral resistance and inflation. 
Two additional auxiliary regressions are also estimated, one with only year dummies and the other with 
just country dummies. The predicted values for their dependent variables are used to create yd and mr, 
which will control for common inflation and time-invariant multilateral resistance, respectively. 
Although the preferred solution for the multilateral resistance problem is an LSDV with time-varying 
country dummies, as proposed by Baldwin & Taglioni (2007) and Head & Mayer (2014), such an 
approach is too taxing on computing resources for a master’s thesis study. There would be a total of 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = 29 ∗ 26 = 754 dummies. The less taxing alternative employed in this study 
is the adoption of time-invariant country dummies, together with year dummies. This approach controls 
for the time-invariant aspect of multilateral resistance, as well as the effects of common inflation on trade 
flows. However, it will not control for the time-variant aspect of multilateral resistance, and therefore the 
accuracy of its results is not comparable to studies that do. 
Another shortcoming of this methodology is its small dataset. Rose (2017) warns that studies with a low 
number of observations, specially a low number of countries, tend to underestimate the trade generating 
effect of the EMU, due to omitted multilateral resistance effects. This means that 𝛽8 will be downward 
biased, possibly affecting the results of the 2nd stage equation. It also means that an opportunity for 
studying other CU’s and comparing them to the EMU is missed. As Glick & Rose (2016) point out, the 
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trade generating effects of the EMU are different from other CU’s, but since this dataset lacks the 
countries that belong to such CU’s, no comparisons can be made. 
 
The 1st stage of the 2SLS model uses a similar GMT: 
𝑇𝐼𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗/𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗)𝑡+𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑗) + 𝛽3ln (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐸𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝛽13𝑚𝑟_𝑦𝑑 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Where the dependent variable is Trade Intensity, and 𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑖𝑌𝑗)𝑡 is omitted, due to potential 
multicollinearity. 
Once the 1st stage has been estimated via OLS and FE, its results are used to estimate the 2nd stage: 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑣, 𝑠)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Where: 
• 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑣, 𝑠)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 denotes the correlation of economic activity between countries i and j during 
period t, v refers to the measure of economic activity used; s refers to the de-trending method 
used; 
• 𝑇?̂?𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 denotes the weight of nominal bilateral trade on combined GDP between i and j at time t, 
predicted in the 1st stage; 
• 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 designates the error term. 
As we have 15 correlations of economic activity and 2 sets of predicted values for the log of bilateral trade 
(OLS and FE), the total number of regressions for the 2nd stage will be 15 ∗ 2 = 30. 
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6. Results 
Predicting the Euro’s effect on Trade by OLS 
To get a sense of the scale of the problem of multicollinearity, a direct estimation of the gravity equation 
with all the country and year dummies is performed. The highest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) detected 
was 1680! This means that, due to collinearity, the variance of the coefficient in question was 1680 times 
larger than what it would be, if there was no correlation with other explanatory variables. In all subsequent 
regressions, where country and year dummies are employed indirectly through auxiliary regressions, the 
VIF’s are much smaller, with the highest being in the order of 2. 
Table 3 presents the results for the OLS estimation. The OLS_N_D model excludes country and year 
dummies. OLS_YD includes variable yd, which corresponds to the predicted values of the dependent 
variable of all year dummies regressed in the residuals of the OLS_N_D model. OLS_MR includes variable 
mr, which is the same as yd, but, country dummies are used instead of year dummies. OLS_MR_YD 
includes both yd and mr. OLS_MRYD includes the variable mryd, which corresponds to the predicted 
values of the dependent variable of all year and country dummies regressed on the residuals of the 
OLS_N_D model. OLS_resid uses the residuals of OLS as its dependent variable. 
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Table 3: Euro’s effect on trade, predicted by OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS_N_D OLS_YD OLS_MR OLS_MR_YD OLS_MRYD 
VARIABLES Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
      
lyy 1.3431*** 1.3441*** 1.1750*** 1.1766*** 1.1654*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0082) (0.0076) (0.0075) 
lyypp -0.7679*** -0.7643*** -0.7555*** -0.7523*** -0.7518*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
laa -0.0162*** -0.0176*** 0.0034 0.0020 0.0012 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
ldist -0.8910*** -0.9073*** -0.8448*** -0.8599*** -0.8613*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0083) 
border 0.6360*** 0.6329*** 0.5053*** 0.5030*** 0.5049*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0285) (0.0252) (0.0244) (0.0241) 
language 1.0298*** 1.0134*** 0.5025*** 0.4897*** 0.4939*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0206) 
eu 0.4067*** 0.3276*** 0.7006*** 0.6268*** 0.6150*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0146) 
euro 0.3003*** 0.3212*** 0.1718*** 0.1916*** 0.1871*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0140) 
nafta 0.6155*** 0.6276*** 1.1190*** 1.1280*** 1.1295*** 
 (0.0528) (0.0543) (0.0697) (0.0704) (0.0705) 
efta 1.0549*** 0.9624*** -0.0829** -0.1631*** -0.1434*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0315) (0.0319) 
landl -0.4875*** -0.4945*** -0.3535*** -0.3604*** -0.3708*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0171) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0117) 
island 0.3633*** 0.3669*** 0.4056*** 0.4088*** 0.4108*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
colony 0.0687** 0.0720** 0.5176*** 0.5188*** 0.5164*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0389) (0.0393) (0.0391) 
yd  1.0209***  0.9363***  
  (0.0400)  (0.0261)  
mr   1.1023*** 1.0978***  
   (0.0068) (0.0066)  
mr_yd     1.0993*** 
     (0.0064) 
      
Observations 20,552 20,552 20,552 20,552 20,552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7206 0.7294 0.8841 0.8915 0.8925 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Source: Own computations. 
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All these models are estimated with robust standard errors, due to them being heteroskedastic. This was 
discovered through the application of White and Breusch-Pagan tests. Like multicollinearity, 
heteroskedasticity does not compromise the unbiasedness of estimators, but affects their variance, 
invalidating significance tests. Global significance tests applied to robust errors confirm that the models 
are all globally significant, and Ramsey’s RESET tests indicate no important explanatory variables are 
missing, at a 1% confidence level. 
 
Table 4: 𝑹𝟐 of Auxiliary Regressions 
 




Year and Country 
Dummies (mr_yd) 
OLS_N_D Residuals OLS_N_D Residuals OLS_N_D Residuals 
ALL Year Dummies Yes No Yes 
ALL Country 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0309 0.5309 0.5597 
Source: Own computations. 
 
Looking at table 4, the magnitude of the problem of omitting multilateral resistance effects is clear. When 
the country dummies are regressed on the residuals of OLS_N_D, the 𝑅2 is very high: 0.53. Virtually half 
of the perturbation term is tied to multilateral resistance.  
In contrast, the effects of world inflation, or of other common shocks to all countries, have a much smaller 
significance. When including yd in OLS_YD, the adjusted 𝑅2 increases, but very little: from 0.72 to ~0.73. 
Unexpectedly, the point estimate for euro increases as well: from 0.3 to 0.32. It is reasonable to think 
that controlling for the common rises in price levels would return a lower point estimate, but Baldwin & 
Taglioni’s (2007, p. 804) results behave in a similar manner. 
When including controls for time-invariant multilateral resistance (mr) in OLS_MR the point estimate of 
euro decreases significantly: from 0.3 to 0.17. This is accompanied by a considerable increase in the 
adjusted 𝑅2, from 0.72 to 0.88. Such a decrease in euro is in accordance with the literature: Rose (2000) 
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predicted a currency union trade effect of ~235%, but that effect diminishes to ~50% when Glick & Rose 
(2002) estimate a GMT by fixed effects. 
OLS_MR_YD and OLS_MRYD control for both time-invariant multilateral resistance and year effects. 
OLS_MR_YD does this by including both yd and mr, while OLS_MRYD includes mryd (which is the product 
of regressing all year and country dummies on the residuals of OLS_N_D, consult table 4 for reference). 
When compared with OLS_MR, which does not control for year effects, the adjusted 𝑅2 increases again, 
but very little: from 0.88 to 0.89. The point estimate for euro also increases slightly, from 0.17 to ~0.19, 
following the behaviour of OLS_YD. It is clear that, out of multilateral resistance and common inflation 
(year) effects, it is the first that most significantly impacts the point estimate of euro. 
Of all models, OLS_MRYD appears to be the most appropriate. It controls for time-invariant multilateral 
resistance (Gold Medal Mistake), inflation (Bronze Medal Mistake), and has the highest adjusted 𝑅2.  
The behaviour of the control variables is, with few exceptions, within expectations. According to the gravity 
theory of trade, the economic “mass” of a country has a positive effect on trade flowing towards that 
country, while distance to partner countries has a negative effect. This behaviour is reflected on lyy and 
ldist, which refer to the product of the pair countries’ GDP and the distance between their capitals, 
respectively. The negative sign on lxxpp (product of per capita GDP) and laa (product of land area) is 
unexpected, but it should be stressed that these variables are added as “nuisance” controls. Perfectly 
estimating their impact on trade is not the intention, but rather use them to attain a more accurate 
estimate of euro.  
The economically and statistically significant estimates of border, language, landl, island and colony are 
to be expected. Two countries that share a border will find it easier to trade with one another. The same 
is true if they both have the same official language. On the other hand, landlocked countries’ trade ties 
with the rest of the world will not be as strong as the ones of those countries that have access to the sea. 
Island countries will trade more, due to a better access to the world’s oceans. Although oil-tankers and 
super-cargo ships are expensive vehicles when compared to trucks and trains, they do not require (outside 
of ports) extensive infrastructure to operate on. The sea in which they roam is essentially free, while roads 
and railways are not. Better access to the sea means better access to the world’s markets. Historical ties 
between colonized countries and colonizers also have a positive effect on trade, due to preferential 
treatment in trade deals. Note that the point estimate for this variable increases significantly when 
multilateral resistance is taken into account, from ~0.07 in OLS_N_D and OLS_YD, to 0.52 in all 
subsequent models. 
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Multilateral resistance has a significant impact on the point estimates of eu, nafta and efta. The point 
estimate for eu increases from ~0.4 to ~0.7 (or ~0.6 when inflation is taken into account). This increase 
is even more significant for nafta, going up from ~0.6 to ~1.12, almost the double of the OLS_N_D 
estimate. However, the most radical result is efta: it goes from ~1 to ~-0.08 (or ~-0.15 when inflation is 
considered). This once again stresses the importance of controlling for multilateral resistance: it not only 
affects the size of coefficients, it affects different estimators differently. It can increase the size of some, 
while decreasing others, sometimes enough to result in a sign swap. 
The highest point estimate for euro when controlling for multilateral resistance is lower than 0.2, and it 
only accounts for the time-invariant part of this effect. If controls for time-varying multilateral resistance 
were included (like time-varying country dummies), the point estimate could be even lower, or higher. 
This means that the economic significance of these results is not 100% clear. 
If euro has any effect on average bilateral trade, it is expected that the actual values for it will increase 
sharply at the time of entry in the Eurozone. This can be tested with a Chow test, which detects structural 
breaks in time-series data. To perform this test, two auxiliary OLS_MRYD models are computed: one 
where euro is 0, the other where it assumes the value 1. Their Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) is then 
used to compute the 𝐹 statistic for the test. 
𝐻0: 𝑛𝑜 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠 ǀ 𝐻1: 𝐻0 𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
𝐹𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 =





9160.67 − (8740.79 + 279.04)
14
(8740.79 + 279.04)
20552 − 2 ∗ 14
= 22.89 
𝑓𝑐𝑟í𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 (𝑘; 𝑛−𝑘) = 𝑓𝛼=5%/2(14; 20657) = ±2.1 
As 𝐹𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 > 𝑓𝑐𝑟í𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙, the null hypothesis is rejected for a confidence interval of 5%. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that a structural break does not exist when countries join the Eurozone is rejected. Even if 
these results are not the most accurate, we can at least rest assured that the effect euro has on trade 
intensity is not insignificant. 
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Predicting the Euro’s effect on Trade by FE 
The results for the fixed effects estimation are presented on table 5. Model FE has no common inflation 
or multilateral resistance controls. FE_YD has controls for inflation (yd). FE_MRYD uses variable mryd, 
which controls for both inflation and multilateral resistance. 
 
Table 5: 1st Stage Fixed Effects  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FE FE_YD FE_MRYD 
VARIABLES Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
    
lyy 2.8427*** 2.4597*** 2.3284*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0305) (0.0307) 
lyypp -2.5487*** -2.1409*** -2.0130*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0319) (0.0321) 
ldist -0.0506 -0.0581 -0.0585 
 (0.0717) (0.0672) (0.0666) 
seaborder 0.2036** 0.2353** 0.2202** 
 (0.1018) (0.0953) (0.0944) 
eu 0.9843*** 0.8514*** 0.8269*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
euro 0.1075*** 0.1424*** 0.1362*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0136) 
nafta 0.1293 0.3730*** 0.3849*** 
 (0.1053) (0.0987) (0.0978) 
efta 0.2031*** 0.0617 0.0691* 
 (0.0426) (0.0400) (0.0396) 
yd  0.7407***  
  (0.0140)  
mr_yd   0.8325*** 
   (0.0148) 
    
Observations 20,552 20,552 20,552 
Number of Country Pairs 812 812 812 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7035 0.7402 0.7447 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Source: Own computations. 
 
Two models are omitted from table 5, one that includes mr, and another that includes mr and yd. Due to 
the fixed effects transformation, the time-invariant mr is eliminated, and the results of these models are 
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the same as FE and FE_YD, respectively. Nevertheless, they are estimated to test the behaviour of mr, 
which was eliminated by STATA as expected. 
When compared to OLS_N_D, the FE model has a similar adjusted 𝑅2 of ~0.7, but the euro estimate 
drops from 0.3 to 0.1. This can be explained by the fact that the fixed effects transformation controls for 
time invariant multilateral resistance. Despite this, the adjusted 𝑅2 of FE is lower than that of OLS_MR 
(0.88). When controls for common inflation are included in FE_YD, the point estimate of euro increases 
to 0.14, and the adjusted 𝑅2 to 0.74. Overall, the FE models show a lower adjusted 𝑅2 and smaller point 
estimates for euro than the OLS models, but the magnitude of these values is still comparable. The point 
estimate for the most appropriate OLS model (OLS_MRYD) was 0.19.  
The FE_MRYD model, instead of using the yd variable to control for common inflation, as in FE_MRYD, it 
uses mryd. This variable is the result of a regression of all year and country dummies on the residuals of 
OLS_N_D (consult table 4 for reference), so it controls for both inflation and time-invariant multilateral 
resistance. But, seeing as the fixed effects transformation already controls this last effect, it might be 
pointless to use this variable instead of yd.  
Note that variable ldist (representing the logarithm of the distance between the capitals of both countries 
in the dyad) is not eliminated in the fixed effects transformation. Since distance does not change over 
time, it would be expected for this variable to be eliminated from the table of results by STATA, as were 
laa, language, landl, island and colony. This is probably due to an error in the dataset. But, as can be 
seen, the coefficient for ldist is very small and statistically insignificant, so its effect on the quality of the 
estimations is limited.    
Another aspect to note is the variable seaborder. Instead of using the variable border, as was done in the 
OLS estimations, the variables landborder and seaborder are used instead (border is simply the sum of 
these two). Due to being time invariant, landborder is omitted during the calculations, but seaborder 
remains. This variable represents countries which, although not connected by land, are nevertheless 
connected by bridges (Denmark and Sweden) or undersea tunnels (United Kingdom and France). As most 
of these infrastructure projects have only opened to the public after 1990, this variable is time-variant 
and is retained by STATA. Its coefficient is relatively small and statistically insignificant, however. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
In tables 6 and 7 are presented the results of regressions that test the inclusion of eea (dummy for 
membership in European Single Market), in both OLS_MRYD and FE_YD, respectively. The aim is to see 
how sensitive euro is to these iterations. 
 
Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares with variables EU and EEA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS_MRYD OLS_eea OLS_eu_eea OLS_no_eu 
VARIABLES Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
     
euro 0.1871*** 0.2453*** 0.1195*** 0.5077*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0135) 
eu 0.6150***  0.4438***  
 (0.0146)  (0.0153)  
eea  0.5552*** 0.3319***  
  (0.0148) (0.0154)  
mr_yd 1.0993*** 1.0460*** 1.0739*** 1.0789*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0067) 
     
Observations 20,552 20,552 20,552 20,552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8925 0.8909 0.8946 0.8831 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Regressors included but not reported: 
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Table 7: 1st Stage Fixed Effects EU and EEA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 FE_YD FE_eea FE_eu_eea FE_no_eu 
VARIABLES Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
Log of Average 
Bilateral Trade 
     
euro 0.1424*** 0.0683*** 0.0540*** 0.3453*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0153) 
eu 0.8514***  0.5927***  
 (0.0113)  (0.0139)  
eea  0.6601*** 0.3576***  
  (0.0097) (0.0117)  
     
Observations 20,552 20,552 20,552 20,552 
Number of Country Pairs 812 812 812 812 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7402 0.7291 0.7519 0.6656 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Regressors included but not reported: lyy, lyypp, 
ldist, seaborder, nafta, efta. Source: Own computations. 
 
But why use eea? Doesn’t eu already fulfil the purpose of representing the European economic block? In 
this dataset, eu is a dummy denoting if both countries in the dyad are members of the European Union 
(or its predecessor organization, the EEC), at time t. As some countries are members of this organization 
since well before 1990 (the starting year of the dataset), and no countries have left it as of 2015 (the final 
year of the dataset), the actual value for some dyads will always be 1. Because a fixed effects 
transformation is applied in FE models, the actual values for these dyads will be 0. The variable eu will, 
therefore, only return results different than 0 after a fixed effects transformation for dyads where at least 
one of the countries joined the EEC/EU after 1990.  
Although the EEC exists since the late 1950’s, the European Single Market only came into being in 1993. 
In 1994, the creation of the European Economic Area extended the privileges of the single market to 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries. When we consider the relatively short time span of 
this dataset, any of these two variables will be better than eu at capturing the trade generating effect of 
EU membership, and its benefits (Single Market, Shengen Area, etc…).  
It is important to capture this effect, because, as can be seen in table 7, the coefficient for euro diminishes 
by half when eu is swapped with eea, from 0.14 to ~0.07. The adjusted 𝑅2 remained almost identical: 
decreasing from 0.74 to ~0.73. When both eu and eea are used in the regression, it increases to 0.75, 
with the point estimate of euro decreasing even further to ~0.05. However, keeping these two variables 
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might simply be overcontrolling the model, as they are not that different from one another during the 
dataset’s timespan.  
The OLS models yield different results (table 6). Like in the FE models, the adjusted 𝑅2 decreases slightly 
when swapping eu for eea, and increases (slightly) when keeping both. But in the first instance, the point 
estimate of euro increases to ~0.25, while diminishing to almost half of its original value in the second 
instance (similar to FE models). This means that in simple OLS regressions, using data for EEA 
membership instead of EU will return higher point estimates of the Eurozone effect on trade. However, 
as the increase in the adjusted 𝑅2 is minimal, keeping both might be overcontrolling the model, just as 
in the FE estimations. It must be noted though, that no multicollinearity problem exists (the VIF for eu is 
1.42 and for eea 2.83) with this approach. 
To sum up, the point estimate for euro in both OLS and FE models is not that different: ~0.19 and ~0.14, 
respectively. But adding/removing eea significantly affects the magnitude of the coefficient. Simply using 
eu as a control variable for the European economic block affects the results of our FE estimation, due to 
our dataset ranging from only 1990 to 2015. But using eea in its place reduces the adjusted 𝑅2, and 
increases the euro coefficient in the OLS, while reducing it in the FE estimation. However, some control 
must be kept, as outright removing both eu and eea results in a much higher point estimate for euro in 
both OLS_no_eu and FE_no_eu. It also reduces the adjusted 𝑅2.  
 
Comparison of Results with Gravity Literature 
Compared with the results of studies and collaborations by Andrew K. Rose, the results of this study 
underestimate the Eurozone’s effect on trade. Glick & Rose (2002, p. 1131), through a simple OLS, 
predict a currency union effect of 1.3, with ~200 000 observations and an 𝑅2 of 0.64. This model does 
not control for multilateral resistance, so it is no wonder that the estimate is as large. The closest 
comparable model in this study, OLS_N_D (table 3) returns a much lower point estimate of 0.3, but it 
has to be noted that the variable used (dummy for euro) is not the same as the one used by Glick & Rose 
(dummy for currency union). This is important, because in a reassessment of their original study, Glick & 
Rose (2016, p. 81) disaggregate the results for each currency union in their dataset (that includes virtually 
all countries in the world) and find that the euro effect is substantially different than the effect of most 
other currency unions. In their subsequent 2016 estimation, Glick & Rose obtain a point estimate of 0.02 
for the euro’s effect on trade, much smaller than their previous estimate for the effect of currency unions 
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(1.12). It is even smaller than the point estimate of this study (0.3). This 2016 model has ~400 000 
observations and an 𝑅2 of 0.67, but, like the 2002 one, it has no controls for multilateral resistance. 
Besides estimating the currency union effect by OLS, Glick & Rose (2002, p. 1133) also employ fixed 
effects. This approach controls the time-invariant multilateral resistance, and yields a point estimate of 
0.65, roughly half of the OLS estimate. The model has ~200 000 observations and an 𝑅2 of 0.12. In 
their 2016 reassessment (p. 82), the point estimate for euro is 0.41, while for other CU’s is 0.75. The 
number of observations is ~400 000 and the 𝑅2 is 0.2. The closest model in this study, FE_YD (table 
5), returns a much lower point estimate of 0.14. 
The Least Squares with time-varying Country Dummies, also known as LSDV model, is also employed by 
Glick & Rose (2016, p. 85). This is the best method for estimating a GMT, as it controls for both time-
invariant and time-varying multilateral resistance, as well as inflation effects. It returns a point estimate 
for the euro effect on trade of 0.43, and 0.3 for other CU’s. It has ~30 000 observations and an 𝑅2 of 
0.86. Baldwin & Taglioni (2007, p. 813) employ the LSDV as well, obtaining a point estimate of 0.34, 
with ~5000 observations and an 𝑅2 of 0.91. The authors (2007, p. 808) also estimate an OLS regression 
with only country and year dummies, which returns a point estimate of 0.21, meaning that adding controls 
for the time-varying part of multilateral resistance increases the magnitude of the euro effect estimator. 
There are no models in this study comparable to the LSDV. The most appropriate, OLS_MRYD (table 3), 
returns a point estimate of ~0.19, but it does not control for time-varying multilateral resistance. Its result, 
however, is very close to the estimate of Baldwin & Taglioni (2007, p. 808) of 0.21 (that also does not 
control for the full effect of multilateral resistance). 
In a metanalysis of the literature, Rose (2017) plots the euro effect estimates of 45 studies and finds that 
most are within a threshold of 0.0 and 0.25, with very few exceptions. The average estimate is ~0.1. In 
this context, the results of this study are not outliers, although Rose criticizes most studies for the small 
size of their datasets (a crime of which this study is also guilty). He argues that, the smaller (or more 
incomplete) the dataset is, the smaller the point estimate will be, as critical information regarding 
multilateral resistance is not provided (refer to section 3 for an in-depth look at the small datasets 
problem). Therefore, applying the methodology of this study on a larger dataset would, according to Rose, 
yield a higher estimate of the euro effect on trade. And, judging from the results of Baldwin & Taglioni 
(2007), controlling for time-varying multilateral resistance with an LSDV would also increase the estimate. 
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The 2SLS Model 
Table 8 presents the results of the 1st stage GMT. The results for the 2nd stage are presented in tables 9 
through 14, using the predicted values for trade intensity estimated in OLS_ti and FE_ti. These models 
are identical to OLS_MRYD and FE_YD, respectively, which were used before to estimate the Euro’s effect 
on trade. The only differences are the dependent variable (average bilateral trade swapped by trade 
intensity) and the omission of lyy (due to potential multicollinearity). 
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Table 8: First Stage Gravity Model of Trade 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS_ti FE_ti OLS_resid 
VARIABLES Trade Intensity Trade Intensity OLS_ti 
Residuals 
    
lyypp -0.0002*** 0.0003*** -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
laa -0.0001***  0.0000 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
ldist -0.0017*** -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000) 
border 0.0145***  -0.0000 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
seaborder  0.0027***  
  (0.0005)  
language 0.0012***  0.0000 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
eu 0.0023*** 0.0013*** -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
euro 0.0020*** 0.0017*** -0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
nafta 0.0080*** 0.0077*** 0.0000 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
efta -0.0036*** 0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
landl -0.0012***  -0.0000 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
island 0.0010***  -0.0000 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
colony 0.0014***  -0.0000 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
yd  0.0012***  
  (0.0001)  
mr_yd 0.0019***  0.0000 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
    
Observations 20,552 20,552 20,552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5888 0.1955 -0.0006 
Number of c_pair_num  812  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Source: Own computations. 
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The quality of these explanatory variables as instruments for trade intensity appears sound. Although the 
coefficients are small, they all appear minimally correlated with the dependent variable. The adjusted 𝑅2 
is also quite high: 0.58 (OLS_ti). When predicated on the residuals (OLS_resid), they return very small 
and statistically insignificant coefficients. Therefore, these explanatory variables seem to comply with the 
good instruments criteria. 
 
Table 9: Economic Activity, detrended by First Differencing, regressed on Trade Intensity, estimated by 
OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1d_ols_gdp 1d_ols_ipi 1d_ols_ipisa 1d_ols_emp 1d_ols_unemp 
VARIABLES Corr_GDP Corr_IPI Corr_IPIsa Corr_Emp Corr_Unemp 
      
Trade Intensity 7.1040*** 15.7963*** 14.1073*** 19.6480*** 15.8102*** 
 (0.5318) (0.4769) (0.5038) (0.5710) (0.4620) 
      
Observations 19,858 18,752 15,398 13,438 19,858 
R-squared 0.0089 0.0553 0.0485 0.0810 0.0557 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Instrumental Variables for Trade Intensity are: 
lyypp, laa, ldist, border, language, eu, euro, nafta, efta, landl, island, colony, mr_yd. Source: Own 
computations. 
 
Table 10: Economic Activity, detrended by Quadratic Filter, regressed on Trade Intensity, estimated by 
OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 4d_ols_gdp 4d_ols_ipi 4d_ols_ipisa 4d_ols_emp 4d_ols_unemp 
VARIABLES Corr_GDP Corr_IPI Corr_IPIsa Corr_Emp Corr_Unemp 
      
Trade Intensity 26.8925*** 16.4520*** 17.0310*** 16.1733*** 6.4026*** 
 (0.8866) (0.7276) (0.7705) (0.7830) (0.5914) 
      
Observations 20,670 19,520 16,248 13,990 20,670 
R-squared 0.0426 0.0255 0.0292 0.0296 0.0056 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Instrumental Variables for Trade Intensity are: 
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Table 11: Economic Activity, detrended by Hodrick Prescott Filter, regressed on Trade Intensity, 
estimated by OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 hp_ols_gdp hp_ols_ipi hp_ols_ipisa hp_ols_emp hp_ols_unemp 
VARIABLES Corr_GDP Corr_IPI Corr_IPIsa Corr_Emp Corr_Unemp 
      
Trade Intensity 10.3963*** 15.9903*** 14.3297*** 17.7415*** 13.7633*** 
 (0.4734) (0.4402) (0.4531) (0.5298) (0.4491) 
      
Observations 20,670 20,182 17,590 13,990 20,670 
R-squared 0.0228 0.0614 0.0538 0.0742 0.0435 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Instrumental Variables for Trade Intensity are: 
lyypp, laa, ldist, border, language, eu, euro, nafta, efta, landl, island, colony, mr_yd. Source: Own 
computations. 
 
Table 12: Economic Activity, detrended by First Differencing, regressed on Trade Intensity, estimated by 
FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 1d_fe_gdp 1d_fe_ipi 1d_fe_ipisa 1d_fe_emp 1d_fe_unemp 
VARIABLES Corr_GDP Corr_IPI Corr_IPIsa Corr_Emp Corr_Unemp 
      
Trade Intensity 20.5813*** 55.0955*** 32.1504*** 61.1426*** 52.6858*** 
 (1.6214) (1.4425) (1.5885) (1.8469) (1.4000) 
      
Observations 19,858 18,752 15,398 13,438 19,858 
R-squared 0.0080 0.0722 0.0259 0.0754 0.0666 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Instrumental Variables for Trade Intensity are: 
lyypp, ldist, seaborder, eu, euro, nafta, efta, yd. Source: Own computations. 
 
Table 13: Economic Activity, detrended by Quadratic Filter, regressed on Trade Intensity, estimated by 
FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 4d_fe_gdp 4d_fe_ipi 4d_fe_ipisa 4d_fe_emp 4d_fe_unemp 
VARIABLES Corr_GDP Corr_IPI Corr_IPIsa Corr_Emp Corr_Unemp 
      
Trade Intensity 97.3952*** 12.3466*** 13.9504*** 71.3227*** 17.7405*** 
 (2.6860) (2.2484) (2.4483) (2.5166) (1.8089) 
      
Observations 20,670 19,520 16,248 13,990 20,670 
R-squared 0.0598 0.0015 0.0020 0.0543 0.0046 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Instrumental Variables for Trade Intensity are: 
lyypp, ldist, seaborder, eu, euro, nafta, efta, yd. Source: Own computations. 
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Table 14: Economic Activity, detrended by Hodrick Prescott Filter, regressed on Trade Intensity, 
estimated by FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 hp_fe_gdp hp_fe_ipi hp_fe_ipisa hp_fe_emp hp_fe_unemp 
VARIABLES Corr_GDP Corr_IPI Corr_IPIsa Corr_Emp Corr_Unemp 
      
Trade Intensity 44.2467*** 65.2518*** 49.5619*** 67.4686*** 57.5029*** 
 (1.4313) (1.3115) (1.4191) (1.6995) (1.3456) 
      
Observations 20,670 20,182 17,590 13,990 20,670 
R-squared 0.0442 0.1093 0.0649 0.1013 0.0812 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***, 1%; **, 5%; *, 10%. Instrumental Variables for Trade Intensity are: 
lyypp, ldist, seaborder, eu, euro, nafta, efta, yd. Source: Own computations. 
 
It must again be noted that the goal here is not to determine exactly how much do business cycles get 
correlated every time trade intensity goes up 1%. The 2nd stage equation does not allow for that, as trade 
intensity is its only explanatory variable. The low 𝑅2 across all 30 regressions is expected, with the highest 
being ~0.11 (table 14). The goal is merely to find out the sign of the relationship between the dependent 
variable (real GDP correlation, Industrial Production Index correlation, Employment correlation and 
Unemployment correlation) and trade intensity (average bilateral trade). 
All 30 regressions return a positive point estimate for trade intensity, statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The size of these coefficients is also significant, with the lowest being 6.1 (table 10), and the highest 
97.3 (table 13). Coefficients are larger for the equations whose 1st stage was estimated by FE, with most 
being above 20. The highest coefficient for equations using OLS estimations of the 1st stage is 26.9 (table 
10). It has to be noted that the explanatory power of the FE estimation of the 1st stage is much lower than 
the OLS’s. While the adjusted 𝑅2 for the OLS estimation is ~0.59, for the FE estimation it is only ~0.2. 
Maybe this has some effect on the magnitude of the coefficients. 
These results suggest that the relationship between business cycle synchronization and trade intensity is 
positive, supporting the view of Frankel & Rose (1998). Therefore, intra-industrial trade is more prevalent 
than inter-industrial trade within currency union members, mitigating specialization and the occurrence 
of asymmetric demand shocks. Consequently, the need for independent monetary policy is not as great, 
and countries are better off joining the Eurozone and benefitting from its positive economic effects. 
However, as the 𝑅2 of these 30 regressions clearly shows, trade intensity is far from being the sole 
explanation for the behaviour of business cycle synchronization. Perhaps trade integration is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for CU membership. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this study, we reviewed the literature regarding the theory of Optimum Currency Areas, and the 
endogeneity of its criteria. Drawing from a modest dataset with 29 countries, from 1990 to 2015, a 
Gravity Model of Trade was used to predict the effect the Euro has had on trade. A 2SLS model, predicting 
the effect of trade intensity on business cycle comovement, was also estimated. Its results were compared 
with the work of Frankel & Rose (1998). 
The best OLS model estimating the Euro’s effect on trade, OLS_MRYD, yields a point estimate of 0.19. 
Economically, this translates to 𝑒0.19 − 1 ~ 21%, i.e. Eurozone countries trade, on average, 21% more 
than non-members, ceteris paribus. The best FE model, FE_YD, yields a lower but comparable point 
estimate of 0.14, which translates to an economic effect of 𝑒0.14 − 1 ~ 15%. The adjusted 𝑅2 is higher 
for OLS_MRYD. These results are lower than the 0.43 of Glick & Rose (2016, p. 85), but are in line with 
most other studies, whose predictions fall within the 0.0 and 0.25 range (Rose, 2017). 
Rose criticizes these studies for their small datasets, which affect the way multilateral resistance is 
calculated. The author (2016, p. 3) explains that “As multilateral trade resistance is a function of all 
bilateral trade barriers, all trade partners should be included for the most accurate estimates”. The author 
claims that this is the reason most studies yield a lower point estimate. With a dataset composed of only 
29 countries, this study does not escape his criticism. 
Another limitation of this study is that time-varying multilateral resistance is not accounted for. Instead of 
applying an LSDV model with time-varying country dummies, as recommended by Baldwin & Taglioni 
(2007) and Head & Mayer (2014), time-invariant country dummies are used instead, together with time 
dummies. This is a form of saving computing power for a limited project such as this one. There would 
be almost a thousand variables for every model if an LSDV was employed. However, not controlling for 
time-varying multilateral resistance seriously affects the accuracy of the results. When Baldwin & Taglioni 
(2007, p. 808 - 813) account for it, their point estimate rises from 0.21 to 0.34. Since this study’s dataset 
starts in 1990 and ends in 2015, it is absolutely certain the Euro has affected multilateral resistance 
among Eurozone member countries, diminishing it in comparison to non-members. Not accounting for 
this variation probably means that the results of this study underestimate the Euro’s effect on trade. 
The point estimate for Euro is found to be sensitive to the specification of the European economic bloc. 
This study uses a dummy for membership in the EU (or its predecessor organization, the EEC) in most 
regressions. However, when swapping this dummy with a dummy for membership in the European Single 
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Market, or European Economic Area (eea), the point estimate for Euro rises in the OLS estimation (table 
6) and diminishes in the FE estimation (table 7). 
Overall, the results of this study indicate that the two assumptions of Frankel & Rose’s endogeneity 
hypothesis hold. The 1st assumption (CU leads to more trade) is supported by the results of the GMT 
estimation (Eurozone members trade 21% more on average amongst themselves than non-members). 
Although these results are not the most accurate, it is more likely that they underestimate rather than 
overestimate the Euro’s effect on trade. The 2nd assumption (more trade leads to more highly correlated 
business cycles) is supported by the results of the 2SLS estimations (positive sign for trade intensity 
coefficient in all regressions). However, the 𝑅2 of these regressions is very low with the highest being 
~0.11. This means that trade intensity is far from being the most important factor in business cycle 
synchronization.  
In the opinion of the student, both assumptions of the endogeneity hypothesis holding true is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition, to prove that a country will attain the economic requirements for Eurozone 
membership ex-post rather than ex-ante. There are other factors, that the regressions of this study do not 
account for, that play a role in business cycle synchronization and must be considered when addressing 
this question. 
If this study were to be revised, it would be possible to improve the accuracy of the 1st stage estimation 
by using a dyadic dataset encompassing all 200+ countries in the world, as well as an LSDV with time-
varying country dummies. This would correct all biases related to multilateral resistance, but the 
computational power needed to perform these estimations would be orders of magnitude higher. There 
would be 201 ∗ 200 ∗ 26 ~1 million observations, compared to the current ~21 thousand. There would 
also be 201 ∗ 26 ~5 thousand time-varying country dummies, compared to the current 29 time-invariant 
country dummies and 26 time dummies. As to the 2nd stage, it would be interesting to study inflation and 
balance of payments comovement, as their behaviour is highly dependent on monetary value fluctuations 
and monetary policy in general. 
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